Six-and 12-month-old infant's eye movements were recorded as they observed feeding actions being performed in a rational or non-rational manner. Twelve-month-olds fixated the goal of these actions before the food arrived (anticipation); the latency of these gaze shifts being dependent (r = .69) on infants life experience being feed. In addition, 6-and 12-month-olds dilated their pupil during observation of non-rational feeding actions. This effect could not be attributed to light differences or differences in familiarity, but was interpreted to reflect sympathetic-like activity and arousal caused by a violation of infant's expectations about rationality. We argue that evaluation of rationality requires less experience than anticipations of action goals, suggesting a dual process account of preverbal infants' everyday action understanding.
Introduction
Infants demonstrate a remarkable range of social skills that help them understand the actions and intentions of others. With this understanding infants start making sense of, and take part in, the complex social interactions that define human interpersonal exchange. In fact, as soon as infants become proficient at imitating complex actions they already possess the ability to distinguish rational from non-rational actions and imitate action goals rather than observed movements (Carpenter, Akhtar, & Tomasello, 1998; Gergely, Bekkering, & Király, 2002; Meltzoff, 1995) .
However, the foundation of action understanding emerges much earlier. Resent studies demonstrate that infants from 6.5 months of age retrospectively evaluate the interaction between a wide range of animated and human characters as rational or non-rational (Csibra, 2008; Csibra, Bíró, Koós, & Gergely, 2003; Kamewari, Kato, Kanda, Ishiguro, & Hiraki, 2005; Wagner & Carey, 2005) . These studies all presented infants with self-propelled agents that move passed an obstacle to reach a goal (rational movement). Once habituated, infants were presented with similar events in which the obstacle had been removed. In these test trials infants appeared surprised if the agent continued on the old, non-rational path but not if the agent changed to a new and, given the current context, rational path to reach the goal. In this context it is important to note that these studies investigate how infants' overall looking time changes over successive action sequences. Infants' reactions are, as such, based on evaluations of past event.
Given that infants evaluate the rationality of a wide range of self-propelled agents it is not likely that this evaluation is solely based on infants own experience with similar events (Csibra, 2008) . In fact, it has been proposed that infants' evaluations of rationality are dependent on abstract well-formedness principles that are applicable to a wide range of stimuli (see the teleological stance, Gergely & Csibra, 2003; Király, Jovanovic, Prinz, Aschersleben, & Gergely, 2003) . These processes are assumed to help infants interpret the world, independent of their own experience with similar events. According to Csibra et al.
